The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis effects rippled through the financial system, banks and sovereign states. We analyze these events, focusing on the Portuguese and Spanish case after providing an insight into the Eurozone. We assessed the pricing of sovereign risk by performing an OLS/2SLS fixed effects panel analysis on a pool of Eurozone countries and a SUR regression with Portugal and Spain covering the period 1999:11 until 2019:6. Our results show that the pricing of sovereign risk changed with the crisis and the "whatever it takes" speech of Mario Draghi. Specifically, market pricing of the Eurozone credit risk, liquidity risk and the risk appetite increased after the crisis and it relaxed afterwards. We did not find evidence of specific pricing regime changes after the speech in the Portuguese and Spanish case.
Introduction
Financial and economic crisis are not new, they can be traced as far back as to the Roman Empire. The most recent one, the 2007 subprime crisis, ignited the fuel which gave rise to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 and later the European sovereign debt crisis. The latter would result in an increase in the sovereign yields of several European countries, compromising their ability to meet their financial obligations. This raised fears of sovereign default amid the financial markets, which would in turn raise these yields yet again, causing a spiral of debt, or a self-fulfilling speculative attack for the affected countries. Coupled with the GFC in this period, this liquidity and sustainability problem reached dire levels in the European Union (EU), resulting in financial support programs in Ireland, Greece and Portugal.
Up until the global financial crisis, economic growth in the European Monetary Union (EMU) was consistent, the fiscal scenario was good, with limited deficits and debt levels rising gently (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013) ; the yields of sovereign bonds were converging to German values and were below 50 basis points (bps) (Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010) . Hence, it is relevant to understand what the drivers of this change were. This can contribute to more informed decisions regarding monetary and fiscal policies, making them more effective in preventing, shortening and decreasing the severity of such events. It is generally accepted in the literature that the factors that determine the yields of sovereign debt are a combination of international and country specific factors, which mirror the risk of the debt. The major and sudden increase in the yields spread cannot be explained only by the change in the macroeconomic fundamentals, and the pricing of risk can change across time (Afonso & Jalles, 2018; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010) . Therefore, due to the GFC, the European Central Bank (ECB) resorted to unconventional monetary policy to restore financial stability in the euro area.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the Portuguese and Spanish case, and this will be done by assessing how the price of sovereign risk changed and which fundamentals contributed the most. Our main results show that while the price of sovereign risk increased after the crisis and it has slightly reduced after the "whatever it takes" (WIT) speech of Mario Draghi, these changes were not of the same magnitude and not all countries were affected equally, namely Portugal and Spain in which we did not find evidence of a price regime modification after Draghi´s speech.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 is the Literature review. Section 3 provides a brief description of the events from the GFC until the WIT, with a focus on Portugal and Spain. Section 4 describes the methodolog. Section 5 presents the data used and the results obtained from the analysis. Section 6 is the conclusion.
Literature
There is a substantial amount of literature regarding the determinants of sovereign risk.
Most of the literature follows one of the following measures in order to assess sovereign risk: government bond yield spreads (Ferrucci, 2003; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Hilscher & Nosbuch, 2010; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010; Edwards, 1984) , government bond yields (Afonso & Silva, 2017) , credit default swaps (CDS) spreads (Aizenman et al., 2011; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013) or sovereign debt credit rating (Afonso et al., 2007; Cantor & Pecker, 1996) .
An earlier key study by Edwards (1984) concluded that national macroeconomic fundamentals such as public debt, foreign reserves, current account balance and inflation were influential drivers for the government bond spreads.
Another study worth pointing out, by Bernoth & Erdogan (2010) , concluded that the impact of the domestic fiscal variables and the risk appetite on the yield spreads can shift substantially over time. Before the crisis the government deficit was largely ignored by financial markets when pricing sovereign risk, while the debt-to-GDP ratio was relevant; after the sovereign debt crisis, markets also began to consider the government's budget balance.
One of the effects of the European crisis is a higher sensitivity to countries fundamentals relative to pre-crisis periods, what is called "wake-up call", especially in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013) .
In a recent paper, Afonso & Silva (2017) analyzed the determinants of sovereign yields of Portugal and Ireland. The results show that both Portuguese and Irish bond yields were influenced by the quarterly variations of the German bond yield and by financial integration (measured by cross holding of government bonds). Also noteworthy was the rise of the Portuguese sovereign yield during the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which consists of ECB´s purchases of government bonds. While under the economic financial assistance programme (EFAP) the debt-to-GDP ratio and the 3-month Euribor (proxy for monetary policy stance) were also significant and positive determinants of the yields in Portugal and Ireland. In addition, the debt-to-GDP ratio had a non-linear effect on the increase of the yields.
The story so far

The Financial Crisis
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 was triggered by a combination of multiple factors concerning governments, private banks, central banks and households. Perhaps the most important ones are bank governance problems, inadequate supervision and regulatory framework, expansionary monetary policy, increase in securitization and risk modelling problems. The interaction of these factors culminated in the U.S. subprime crisis. The low interest rates available made it easy to grant loans. Nonetheless the banks were not properly considering the risk of the loans. Mortgage loans were securitized into asset backed securities (ABS) and could be even further processed into collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Through financial engineering, high risk mortgage loans were repacked by the financial system into AAA investment grade securities.
This recipe proved to be disastrous, and a real estate bubble was built on top of these factors, which eventually collapsed with the tightening of monetary policy and with the increase in non-performing loans. U.S. banks suffered huge losses, which led some institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, to file for bankruptcy. Investor´s confidence was shaken, even the biggest financial institution could fall. This greatly hampered the banks' ability to finance themselves, since they could neither get the funding needed in the capital markets nor in the interbank market. The financial institutions found themselves with their balance sheet full of illiquid and depreciated assets and without the ability to access their pre-crisis funding sources (Faeh et al., 2009) The impact was felt across the entire world due to the interconnections of the financial system, namely because the previously mentioned ABS and CDO were sold across the globe but also CDS.
Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe
The outlook on Europe was not better than in the U. S. The banks were also highly affected by the financial crisis and the mistrust spillover crossed the Atlantic Ocean. As in the U.S, banks and the economy also suffered a liquidity crisis. To keep the banks afloat, the governments intervened in multiple ways, such as asset purchases, capital injections, asset guarantee and debt guarantee (Faeh et al., 2009) . This was done so as not to carry the risk of further destabilizing the economy and the financial system. Besides having to inject liquidity in the financial system, the EU countries acting on accordance with the plan drawn by the European Commission, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), enacted a fiscal stimulus programme.
To mitigate the pernicious effects of the recession brought by the global crisis and to avoid a downward spiral "…that investment and consumer purchases will be put off, sparking a vicious cycle of falling demand, downsized business plans, reduced innovation, and job cuts" as described by the Commission of the European Communities (2008), a series of counter cyclical macroeconomic measures led to governments increased spending with the purpose of breathing some air into the economy. Still, this would put more pressure on the countries with the most fragile fiscal balances.
The EERP´s aim was to avoid a deep recession, by increasing demand through a fiscal stimulus, amounting to €200 bn (1.5% of EU GDP); €170 bn should come from national governments budgets and €30 bn from the EU funding (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). In April and June 2009, the fiscal support amounted to 3.3% and 5% of the EU GDP respectively. In average, the fiscal balances and the debt-to-GDP ratio in EU worsened, from -0.9% to -6.6% and from 57.5% to 73.4% respectively between 2007 and 2009. Before the crisis, even with disparate macroeconomic and fiscal positions (Lane, 2012) , the markets were assuming a convergence of the Eurozone to the German economy and thus priced bonds equally (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012) , the spreads between German bonds and Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy were close to 0 (Lane, 2012) as it can be seen in financial markets concern about their ability to keep up with their future debt obligations, (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015) ; the spread versus the German bond would rise above 300 bps for Italy and Spain (Lane, 2012) . The countries with the most fragile economies and lingering public finance sustainability issues were exposed, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Access to the capital markets would eventually be cut off for the first three countries due to spiking yields on their sovereign bonds. These yields reflected the risk, the apprehension and the risk aversion of the debt markets at the time. To keep up with their financial obligations and avoid a default, these countries would be assisted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU through an EFAP.
With the advent of the financial crisis the ECB began a gradual reduction of the interest rates, until it reached an historical low of 0 on 2016. Due to the massive shock of the financial crisis and later the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB resorted to unconventional monetary policy to keep its objectives.
Figure I -10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
Unconventional Monetary Policy
The European Central Bank (ECB) main role is to ensure price stability but without prejudice contribute to the achievement of the economic objectives of the EU (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2016), which are full employment and balanced economic growth (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016). To comply with his mandate, the ECB possesses the following "standard" instruments of monetary policy (Jäger & Grigoriadis, 2017; Pereira, 2016) :
• Reserves -banks must hold 1% of their liabilities as funds at their national central bank, this allows banks to react to short term changes in the money market;
• Open Market Operations -through these the ECB guides the interest rates and manages the liquidity in the market, the most important one is the main refinancing operation (MRO);
• Standing facilities -the deposit and marginal lending facility, their purpose is to manage the overnight liquidity; by allowing overnight deposits at the ECB with a lower rate than the MRO and to grant overnight liquidity to banks from the ECB at a rate above the MRO respectively. When the standard mechanisms are not enough, the ECB can resort to unconventional monetary policy, as it did to address the financial and later the sovereign debt crisis. These measures were implemented to safeguard the stability of the financial system and to ensure the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Afonso & Sousa-Leite, 2019; Jäger & Grigoriadis, 2017; Pereira, 2016) :
• Forward guidance, by guiding the expectations of the interest rates via announcements;
• Qualitative/credit easing, done by changing the ECB balance sheet composition;
• Quantitative easing, which consists of increasing the ECB balance sheet size by buying securities in the secondary market (sovereign and corporate bonds, asset backed securities) and refinancing operations at low interest rates, namely the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations;
• Decrease to record lows the interest rates of MRO, standing and marginal lending facilities.
Portugal
From 1995 to 2001 Portugal experienced an economic boom, in anticipation for the participation in the Eurozone project; this currency union would decrease not only country and exchange rate risks but also inflation (Blanchard, 2007; Blanchard & Portugal, 2017) .
Consequently, the nominal and real interest rates decreased substantially. At the time it was also believed it would trigger a faster convergence and higher growth. This resulted in increased investment and spending from the households and firms (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017; Lourtie, 2011) .
In this period the economy grew on average 3.5% in real terms and the unemployment rate declined, while the trade deficit increased, and the current account balance worsened to a staggering -10%; the debt to GDP was barely affected, it was reduced from 58% to 53%. The budget deficit improved from -4.2% to -3.3%, while the cyclically adjusted primary balance, which discounts the lower interest rates and the output growth (Blanchard, 2007) , deteriorated from 1.5% to -2.6% (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017) .
In the period from 2002 until 2007 GDP growth stalled to an average of 1.1%.
Accompanying this was an increase in the unemployment rate from 5.5% to 8.7%. Private consumption growth decreased, and public spending increased, partially to offset the former, and the cyclically adjusted deficit increased to 3% of GDP (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017) . The debt-to-GDP ratio increased to 68.4% in 2007 and the current account balance hovered around -10%. Blanchard & Portugal (2017) point a couple factors for this economic status such as lower levels of remittances, the competition from the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in that period and a decrease in competitiveness due to the increase of 4.3% of labour costs over the euro average.
By 2008-2009 Portugal, as most of the developed world, was facing the consequences of the GFC, and stumbled into a recession; even though the effects were not as pronounced, the Portuguese economy shrank less than the euro zone in these years (Reis, 2013) . Portuguese exports decreased by 10.2%, mainly due to a reduction of the output of the trading partners (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017) ; while imports decreased by 9.9% in 2009 (Correira, 2016) .
Banks' ability to obtain funding through the capital markets was reduced (Caldas, 2013) and
there was a deceleration in credit supply due to an increase in the cost of funds, even with the ECB and Bank of Portugal liquidity provisions (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017; Caldas, 2013) . In this period two banks run into troubles, BPN and BPP; the first was nationalized in November 2008 and the second went bankrupt in 2010.
In 2008 the Portuguese government implemented the Initiative on Strengthening Financial Stability (IREF) (see measures in the Appendix Table AI ), to better equip and prepare the financial system to deal with the crisis and to strengthen it. The objective was to ensure funding to the economy and safeguard the deposits (República Portuguesa, 2009 ). In the same period the government applied the measures (see Appendix Table AII ) to protect the families and the enterprises. In principle, these measures would be followed by an expansionary fiscal policy in 2009 (described in Appendix Table AIII) Portugal could be en route to a sustainable growth path (European Commission, 2016). Some noteworthy reforms targets were:
• Fiscal policy -reduce the budget deficit to 3% of GDP by 2013 and hence stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio through the expense and revenue side;
• Labour market -increase flexibility costs by loosening employment protection legislation, decreasing unemployment benefits duration and increasing its coverage, wage-setting mechanisms, active labour market policies, vocational training and tertiary education;
• Goods and services markets -increase competition in the transportation, energy, telecommunication and postal sectors; dynamize the services sector and regulated professions such as real estate, construction, accountants, lawyers and pharmacists by removing barriers to the entry.
Portugal ended the programme on May 2014 without needing to receive the final tranche of €2.5 bn, having regained access to capital markets by 2013 with a budget deficit of 4.5% of GDP and long-term bond yield around 3% (European Commission, 2016).
Spain
Until • Creation of the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA) to provide liquidity to credit institutions and promote lending to the private sector;
• Set up of a system to grant State guarantees to new issues of Spanish credit institutions;
• Increased deposit protection from €20,000 to €100,000, with the objective of improving depositors and investors' confidence;
• Formation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB I) do deal with restructuring processes of credit institutions which failed in dealing with their difficulties and to reinforce the funds of credit institutions undergoing mergers;
• Tightening of the provisioning requirements for past-due loans (Circular 3/2010 of Banco de Espanã);
• Reform of the savings bank sector aiming at promoting access to capital markets, granting savings banks alternative ways to engage in financial activity;
• Legislation and measures to boost the professionalism of savings banks governing bodies;
• Changes to the Capital requirements in line with the Basel III accord.
Acting accordingly with the EERP, the Spanish government implemented a set of temporary fiscal measures that amounted to a fiscal stimulus of 11.2 billion euro in 2009, i.e. In June 2012, the Spanish government requested financial assistance from the EU to recapitalize part of its banking system, which was unable to do in the capital markets due to worries of the impact of the gloomy economic activity on the banks' balance sheet and the interactions between the sovereign risk and bank risk (Banco de Espanã, 2017; Marti & Pérez, 2016) . This assistance programme was approved by the EU in July 2012 and started in December 2012, with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) granting 41.5bn euro (around 4% of Spanish GDP) and ended on January 2014 (Marti & Pérez, 2016) .
Whatever it takes
The ECB resorted to unconventional monetary policy to tackle the crisis as far back as 2009 with the purchase of euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the euro area (CBPP) and
other programs such as the Securities markets programme (SMP) and the Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs).
Even with these measures, the sovereign debt crisis spread, and in November 2011 the yield spreads over Germany peaked at 189 bp in France, 560 bp in Italy, 485 bp in Spain and 360 bp in Belgium (Banco de Espanã, 2017).
Between June and July 2012, the Euro area countries adopted several measures to address the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. In June the move towards a more comprehensive economic and monetary union was taken, the first step was the beginning of the establishment of a banking union, starting with the creation of a centralized supervisory system, the Single Supervisory Mechanism. In July, in the same conference, the ECB through Mario Draghi announced another programme named Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), consisting of buying an unlimited amount of sovereign bonds on the secondary market of member states in financial difficulty and stated "Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro."
In September 2014 a third round of CBPP and an asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) were announced, which together with the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) would become the expanded asset purchase programme (APP), launched in January 2015 in order to offset the low inflation and set it out on the correct path towards 2%.
The unconventional monetary policy adopted by the ECB had a decisive impact in managing the sovereign debt crisis, effectively reducing the sovereign bond yields (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015; Pereira, 2016; Jäger & Grigoriadis, 2017; Afonso & Kazemi, 2018; and Afonso & Jalles, 2019) .
Methodology
In order to model sovereign yield spreads these should be considered as a measure of perceived sovereign risk by the markets, which is formed by credit risk, liquidity risk and risk appetite (Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Hauner et al., 2010) . Hence, together with the intertemporal government budget constraint and the fundamentals behind it, the determinants of government bond yields can be scrutinized.
We will use a OLS fixed effects panel data model, with a monthly frequency, as is commonly done in the literature (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010; Edwards, 1984; Hauner et al., 2010 ) on a pool of European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) to make general inferences about the dynamics between government debt yields and the fundamentals. Due to Greece distinctive features, the analysis will be performed excluding and including this country.
In order to account for potential endogeneity a 2SLS regression will also be performed, the instrumental variables will be the sixth, twelfth, eighteenth and twenty-fourth month lags of the independent variables.
A SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) model will be applied to Portugal and Spain to determine specific country relations between the explanatory variables and sovereign yields similar to Afonso & Nunes (2015) .
We model the sovereign bond yields by comparing it to German ones. Therefore, the dependent variable ( , ) is:
where , is the yield spread versus Germany of country i at time t. The testable regression will then take the form:
where ,
and Ω are constants, , and Ω are the country-specific fixed effects, respectively before crisis, after crisis and after the WIT, , is the matrix of explanatory variables and , and are the coefficients to estimate. A change in the parameters over time will be possible via the introduction of a dummy variable ( ) in the regression as was done in Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) , and this dummy will take the value of one for the period after the fall of Lehman Brothers, September 2008. This model is expanded by adding another dummy variable ( ) which will take the value of one after July 2012, this was the month of the WIT speech of Mario Draghi. These two dummy variables will allow us to check if and how the markets perception and risk pricing of the sovereign bonds changed after these two events.
Evidences of a bond pricing regime change after the WIT and the OMT announcement were already found by with a time-varying parameter panel, with this pre WIT regime characterized by a weaker link between the fundamentals and the spreads but with higher spreads compared to the pre-crisis period.
The preliminary analysis below was done to verify the time series properties of our data, the Hausman test statistics, Modified Wald and Wooldridge tests are reported in Table I and To account for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation we used Newey West standard errors.
Empirical Analysis
Data
The period under analysis is 1999:11-2019:6, which covers the last years of the great moderation period, the GFC, the sovereign debt crisis and the introduction of the unconventional monetary policy measures. The starting date of 1999 was chosen because it is the year of the introduction of the euro.
In line with previous literature the explanatory variables, used in the right-hand side of specification (2), will be the debt-to-GDP ratio, the budget balance (% of GDP), the real effective exchange rate (REER), the Chicago Board of Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), the bond yield bid-ask spread (BAS) and the 3-month Euribor rate.
Government debt and budget balances, which are measures of the credit risk, were taken from the European Commission forecasts, allowing to integrate the forward-looking expectations of investors which might also rely on these reports as a source of information (Attinasi et al, 2009; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Gerlach et al., 2010) . Since the forecasts are (generally) published at a semiannual frequency and we are using monthly data, for the months between each forecast we used the last forecast available. These two variables are used in the regression as the respective difference against Germany. We expect the debt ratio to have a positive sign, as the stock of government debt increases compared to its GDP, so does the risk and accordingly, the yields spreads. Higher values of the budget balance ratio imply a healthier budgetary position and so the coefficient for this determinant is expected to be negative.
Moreover, as in Afonso & Kazemi (2018) and Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012) we expect the REER to be positive, so a currency appreciation increases the spreads. The VIX will be used as a measure of risk, and the daily data was transformed to a monthly frequency by averaging it, and as markets tensions and volatility increase so should the yield spreads.
To introduce a measure of liquidity risk we used the BAS, and this variable should display a positive estimated sign with higher values of BAS meaning that sovereign bonds are less liquid and hence command higher spreads.
The 3-month Euribor is introduced to proxy the monetary policy of the ECB and we anticipate it to be positive as in Afonso & Silva (2017) , as the ECB monetary policy becomes more accommodative, yield spreads should decrease. The sources and descriptive statistics for our data set are displayed in the Appendix Table AIV and Table AV. As it can be observed in Figure 2 The liquidity of the government bonds of both countries decreased after the Eurozone crisis, but was much more pronounced in Portugal as seen in Figure 5 . Two trends are visible regarding the REER in Figure 6 , until 2008 an increasing trajectory, followed by a decrease not as steep as the previous trend. The decreasing trajectory of the Euribor rates after 2008, as seen in Figure 7 , illustrates the more accommodative monetary policy adopted by the ECB in the last years. 
Baseline
First, we analyze the results of the OLS/2SLS fixed effects (FE) model on a pool of European countries, with Greece and excluding it, presented in Table I and Table II respectively. The SUR regression results are discussed afterwards.
[ Table I] In both regressions without the dummies (columns 1 and 3) , only the budget balance and the BAS are statistically significant, and both are associated with their anticipated sign, negative and positive accordingly but the coefficients are substantially bigger in the 2SLS regression. It should be noted that besides the VIX, all the other variables, while statistically insignificant have the unanticipated sign.
Regarding the regressions in columns 2 and 4, before the crisis their determinants differ;
while in the OLS regression the debt ratio, the budget balance and the BAS are significant, in the 2SLS solely the budget balance is significant. Only the debt ratio has the expected (positive) sign, hence markets were mispricing the other two and not pricing the remainder variables.
After the crisis and until the WIT the budget balance and the VIX change are statistically significant, both display the "correct" sign, negative and positive respectively. These regressions display different results for the other determinants, the BAS is significant in the OLS while the REER and Euribor are significant in the 2SLS, all with the expected signals.
The debt ratio is not significant and exhibits an unexpected negative sign. From the WIT event onwards, in the OLS regression the budget balance pricing is statistically significant but becomes less negative. In the 2SLS the change in the VIX is significant and is negative. The REER is significant and has a negative sign in OLS and 2SLS.
The BAS coefficient is also modified and becomes greater in both cases.
Excluding Greece
The OLS and 2SLS specifications without the dummies are similar to the ones in the previous section except for the debt ratio, which now reveals a positive sign and is significant in the latter version.
As for regressions 6 and 8, in the pre-crisis period the budget balance ratio is positive and significant as in the version including Greece (see Table II ). In the 2SLS the Euribor rate is also significant and positive.
For both regressions in the intermediate period, the change for all the determinants are statistically significant and have the expected sign except the Euribor in 2SLS, which also has the expected positive sign but is not significant.
In the last period, in the 2SLS specification the VIX is the sole statistically significant regressor, displaying a negative sign.
[ Table II ]
SUR
The budget balance for Portugal and Spain before the crisis displays a statistically significant mispricing since it has a positive sign (see Table III ). In Spain the VIX and the BAS are also significant and have a positive sign, while in Portugal only the latter is significant but has a negative sign which points to the Portuguese yield spread vis-à-vis Germany decreasing in times of increased volatility. This implies a market perception of the Portuguese debt as a safer asset.
After the financial crisis, in both countries, the budget balance is again statistically significant, but the sign becomes negative, illustrating the markets new attention to this economic fundamental and the underlying credit risk linked to this variable. For Portugal the VIX and the BAS become statistically significant and positive, exhibiting the perspective change for the Portuguese debt, as volatility increases, so does the spread vis a vis Germany and the liquidity risk begins being priced as well, with a lower liquidity (higher BAS) meaning higher yields spreads.
The results after WIT less obvious for Spain, the budget balance coefficient becomes more negative, implying an increased sensitivity to higher projected deficits compared to the previous period and the monetary policy proxy is significant for the first time, while displaying an unexpected negative sign, contradicting the theory, with lower Euribor rates the spreads should diminish. As for Portugal only the BAS is statistically significant with a positive sign, which shows the ever-increasing importance of the liquidity in the pricing of sovereign risk.
[ Table III ]
Conclusion
The objective of this study was to study how the pricing of Portuguese and Spanish sovereign risk by the markets was affected by the financial and subsequent sovereign debt crisis and with the advent of the unconventional monetary policy. This was done by investigating how the determinants of the sovereign bond yields behaved between 1999 and 2019.
After the financial crisis capital markets began pricing correctly all the components of the sovereign risk, this is patent in the change to the expected signs of the fiscal position (credit risk), the BAS (liquidity risk) and the VIX (risk appetite). Therefore, our findings are coherent with the hypothesis that the financial markets were not reflecting the true risk of Eurozone sovereign bonds after the introduction of the Euro until the crisis and became more sensitive after it. Indeed, the shift in the market pricing of the sovereign risk went hand in hand with the mounting fiscal imbalances.
After the WIT event, the results are weaker than expected, but still display the dissipation of the tensions over the economic fundamentals of the Eurozone countries in the increase of the overall coefficient for the budget balance, while remaining negative, which is the a priori expected correct sign.
The idiosyncrasies of Greece are unfolded when we compare the model with this sovereign state to the version without it. While the wake-up call after the crisis can be seen in all its strength in the version without Greece, only when including this sovereign state, were we able to see a change in the yields spreads after the WIT.
In addition, the SUR regression shows that the markets perception change for Portugal and Spain, regarding the credit risk, was focused on the budget balance. The estimated coefficient for the budget balance change is smaller when compared to the results of the full Eurozone panel but when compared to the panel without Greece, the Portuguese one has a higher magnitude, while the Spanish one is between the OLS and the 2SLS result. Portugal was one of the most affected countries by the sovereign debt crisis, so this result is not surprising.
The only pricing changes for Spain in the SUR regression are the budget balance and an less obvious result for the Euribor after the WIT. Hence, the markets pricing change of our selected variables might not be as suited for the Spanish as it was for Portugal and other Eurozone countries. The non-statistically significance of Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio might be a result of the years prior to crisis, in which its levels were lower than Germany.
Our results show that the Eurozone sovereign bonds pricing was changed, with an increase in the price of sovereign risk across all its factors and a subsequent decrease after the WIT. As for Portugal, there is a more pronounced increase in the price of sovereign risk.
We did not find evidence of a dissipation of the tensions after WIT in neither Portugal nor Spain, in fact the liquidity (BAS) and credit risk (budget balance-to-GDP ratio) pricing increased in these countries respectively. This might be due to the model limitation, a more dynamic approach, such as a time varying coefficients model, allowing the coefficients to change across time instead of at specific moments in time, could provide different findings for these countries and hence constitutes a pertinent follow up to this study.
While our findings and model cannot explain in full detail and without a doubt the dynamics of the price of sovereign risk in the last years, they do present a picture and help understand what happened; in the words of Box (1979) , "For such a model there is no need to ask the question "Is the model true?". If "truth" is to be the "whole truth" the answer must be "No". The only question of interest is "Is the model illuminating and useful?" " Business support I)Introduction of a general tax bracket with a reduced corporate tax rate II)Reduction of advance payments by small and medium sized enterprises (SME) III)Creation of a mechanism enabling the advance payment of EU funds granted to businesses IV)Constitution of credit lines targeted to the SME with improved financing conditions to promote corporate investment V)Implementation of the Programme for the Extraordinary Settlement of the States' Debts Source : Adapted from República Portuguesa, 2009. Fostering Renewable Energies, Energy Efficiency and Energy Transmission Infrastructure I) Installation of solar panels and micro-generation units (mini-wind turbines) II) Investment in energy transmission infrastructure III) Improvement of energy efficiency of public buildings IV) Investment in energy metering networks Modernisation of Technological Infrastructure -New Generation Broadband Networks Support for carrying out investments in next generation broadband networks Special support for economic activity, exports and SME I)SME credit lines with partial subsidization of the interest rate and full subsidization of the guarantee fee II)Creation of a fund of EUR 175 million to co-finance domestic and international mergers and acquisitions operations III)Support national SME trade transactions in external markets by providing additional credit risk coverage IV)Support to activities promoting the country abroad V) Support to private investment projects in agriculture and agro-industry VI) Creation of a credit facility supporting agriculture and agro-industry exports and competitiveness VII) Tax credits for investment VIII)VAT Reverse-charge in the provision of goods and services to Public Administration IX) Reduction to the VAT reimbursement threshold X) Reduction to the advance tax payment Protecting employment and strengthening social protection I) Reduce the employer's contribution to Social Security by 3% for workers older than 45 years II) Support for enterprises and workers in case of a temporary reduction of activity III) creation of traineeships for young people IV) support the return to work of the unemployed, particularly the long-term unemployed and the unemployed aged over 55 years V) Expansion of social protection by temporarily extending unemployment benefits Source: Adapted from República Portuguesa, 2009. 
